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Abstract In this paper we argue that the urban neighborhood is a social product that serves as an instrument to ensure the social stability. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the socialist work unit (danwei), which assumed a basic role in socialist policy and the embodiment of the institution, has been the elementary so-cial cell in the planned economy. With the decline of danwei and the introduction of shequ in the market-oriented 
economy, neighbourhood transformation exercises a deep influence on social integration and personal unfold-ing and poses a big challenge for social coherence. After exploring the neighbourhood concepts in the Chinese context, the paper tracks the trajectory of neighbourhood transformation from danwei to shequ and analyses the practice of neighbourhood management. It concludes that the new practice of neighbourhood management remains a sort of ‘old wine in new skins’ in regard of its top-down approach.
ZusammenfassungAm Beispiel der Veränderung chinesischer Nachbarschaften wird in diesem Beitrag diskutiert, inwiefern diese dazu beitragen, die soziale Stabilität aufrechtzuerhalten. Seit der Gründung der Volksrepublik China 1949 bil-dete das danwei als sozialistische Arbeitseinheit und gleichzeitig fundamentale soziale Gemeinschaft das Rück-grat der chinesischen Planwirtschaft. Danweis übernahmen damit die grundlegende Rolle der institutionellen Integration der Bevölkerung in die sozialistische Politik. Mit dem rezenten Wandel zu einem marktwirtschaft-lich orientierten Wirtschaftssystem wurde das Konzept der danweis durch das der shequs ersetzt. Aus dieser Transformation resultieren erhebliche Herausforderungen für den sozialen Zusammenhalt, da dieser Wandel 
tiefgreifenden Einfluss auf die soziale Integration und persönliche Entfaltung des Individuums nimmt. Nachdem die verschiedenen Konzepte chinesischer Nachbarschaften erläutert werden, befasst sich dieser Artikel mit dem zeitlichen Ablauf der Transformation, um anschließend deren Verwaltungsstrukturen zu analysieren. Es konnte dabei festgestellt werden, dass diese neuen Gemeinschaften aufgrund des Fortbestehens von Top-Down-Prinzi-pien als ‚alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen‘ bezeichnet werden können.
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1. IntroductionThe neighbourhood is a key dimension for maintain-ing social cohesion (Forrest and Kearns 2001). All hu-man activities involving political, social, economic and cultural affairs are locally anchored and attached. Micro-spaces of the city play a central role for the hu-
man being and personal flourishment ( Jacobs 1961; 
Alexander 1979; Whyte 2001; Lefebvre 2014). They are crucial for the conduct of everyday life, social repro-duction, and the construction of social meanings. In the perspective of ordinary citizens, the city may be thought of as a dense, complex, and often contradic-
tory web of meaning that, however difficult to disen-tangle, are yet essential to the good life (Friedmann 
1999). Unfortunately, these meanings are difficult to decipher from the perspectives of strategic master planning, quantitative index systems, or theoreti-cal models, which may appeal to the local authority. Given this lack of representation, dynamic change oc-casioned by planned interventions that are conceived at macro-scales leads to the alienation of the city’s lived spaces, causing widespread anomie, destroying individual as well as community bonds, and deepen-ing an already pervasive sense of powerlessness of local inhabitants. The response to this problem must begin with an acknowledgment of the importance of places for the conduct of everyday life (Friedmann 1999; Lefebvre 2014). Therefore, it is high time for ur-ban scholars to reclaim the neighbourhood. In doing so, it is necessary to understand the neighbourhood transformation from historical as well as contempo-rary perspectives. Before analysing the practice of neighbourhood gov-ernance and its transformation in China, it is neces-sary to clarify some basic terms related to the neigh-bourhood in the Chinese context. Generally, the term refers to the immediate surroundings of homes and the relationship between the neighbours. It serves as an articulating interface of political negotiations and social intervention between the state and its citizens (Webster et al. 2005; Read 2012). Nevertheless, the connotation of the neighbourhood is culturally, social-ly and politically embedded. There are a number of 
generally used definitions of neighbourhood, such as “an area where the residents are drawn and held to-
gether by common and beneficial interests” (Choguill 2008: 42). As such, the concept of neighbourhood has drawn great interest by human geographers, urban sociologists and political scientists over the recent decades.
In the context of China, however, the concept has al-ways been spatially embedded in the administrative structure since ancient times (Bray 2005; Friedmann 2005; Tomba 2005; Meyer 2009; Read 2012). The neighbourhoods serve as platforms for social gather-ings, recreational and communal activities, but also for administrative grassroots engagement, in which the state creates, sponsors, and manages organisa-tions that facilitate governance and policing by build-ing institutional-personal relationships within the collective society (Heberer 2009; Read 2012; Audin 2015). From the power perspective, China adopts a model of two levels of government (city government and district government) and three levels of admin-
istration (adding the street office) (Bray 2006; Wu 2018) (Fig. 1)1. The term ‘community’ in China, how-ever, unlike the understanding in the English litera-ture, which is often related to civil society, individual empowerment, social justice and grassroots initia-
tive, is confined within a narrow and specific defini-
tion underpinned by three key characteristics: first, the nature and functions of the community are to be determined by the government; second, the communi-
ty performs a largely administrative role; and finally, each community has a clearly demarcated territorial space (Bray 2006). Accordingly, the Chinese commu-nity (shequ) is designated as the basic unit of urban so-cial, political and administrative organisation, aimed 
at developing a shared identification resting on com-mon interests and needs. Geographically, every shequ catchment area includes several residential quarters (xiaoqus), also called neighbourhood blocks, neigh-bourhoods for short2. In terms of governance, each community has its own community committee, neigh-bourhood committee or residents’ committee (shequ 
jumin weiyuanhui) and each is in charge of the resi-dents living in that community3. The home owners are entitled to vote for their homeowners’ association (HOA), a sort of civil organisation which represents the interests of the owners and safeguards their re-lated concerns. Currently, with the introduction of the grid management system at the community level and the increasingly sophisticated digital technology, the neighbourhood is becoming more a political instru-ment to regulate, control and supervise individual be-havioural patterns (Hornby 2016; Kostka 2019). This topic will be elaborated later on in this paper.
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Normally, the average size of a shequ is between 5,000 and 12,000 inhabitants4. Due to growing ur-
ban sprawl and the influx of migrants into the cities, the total number of these neighbourhood organisa-tions has increased rapidly. In the period from 2009 
to 2016, the number of street offices increased from 6,685 to 8,105, while the number of residential com-munities grew from 85,000 to 103,000 (Ministry of 
Civil Affairs 2018). These are not just the pure figures, they suggest also the social-spatial transformation and possibly more administrative organisations for the neighbourhood governance. From the functional perspective, the Chinese neigh-bourhoods are also understood as a place for teaching and internalising ‘civilised behaviour’, for the ‘moral development’ of society as well as the elevation of the people’s ‘moral quality’ (Bray 2006). Visible and ubiq-uitous posters repeatedly emphasise that the change in values, the creation of public morals and a social awareness of the people are ‘central factors’ and goals of community development (ibid). An illustrative ex-ample is the indoctrination of ethics by big characters publicised on the walls of many shequs: ‘love the father-land and observe all laws’; ‘be courteous, honest and sincere’; ‘show solidarity and be friendly’; ‘be indus-trious, frugal and progressive’; ‘have respect for work 
and make sacrifices’; ‘resolutely root out black and evil forces’ (The Economist 2014, 2018, 2019). It is primarily patriotism, the internalisation of moral values through propaganda campaigns, social control, and the consci-
entious compliance with required standards and offi-cial instructions, which are supposed to result in the development of ‘civic morality’ (Bray 2006; Heberer 2009). These slogans, in which the state authority ar-ticulates its will to the individual citizen, have always been a feature of the urban landscape in China.
After 40 years of opening and reform, China’s neigh-
bourhoods have witnessed a significant transition from danwei to shequ, and the profiles of the neigh-bourhood become more diverse. As an academic re-sponse, studies on the neighbourhood transforma-tion have emerged (Friedmann 2005; Ma and Wu 2005; 2018; Bray 2005; 2006; Read 2003 2012; Tomba 2005; 2014). Most are based on the three stages: the planned economy system prior to reform, in which the 
danwei played the predominant role in the neighbour-hood governance (Yang and Zhou 1999; Bray 2006; 
Friedmann 2005; Hebel 2009), while the residents’ committees ( juweihui) served as a complementary organisation (Read 2000). The second period is after the dissolution of the danwei, in which Chinese cities 
have seen the influx of migrants, private sector work-ers and laid-off workers who have fallen out of danwei system, and thus it was an imperative to reconnect those outsiders with the state (Bray 2006; Friedmann 2005; Heberer 2009; Heberer and Göbel 2013; Logan 2008). Since the initiative of the community build-ing (shequ jianshe), more sholarship is concentrated on the civil society (Heberer 2009; Read 2003, 2012; 
Xu 2008; Tomba 2005; 2014); network building (Read 2012); neighbourhood elections and welfare delivery (Derleth and Koldyk 2004; Friedmann and Chen 2011). With the socio-spatial heterogeneity and individual awareness, there is more literature on the emergence of new residential forms in China, especially on gat-ed communities (Breitung 2012; Huang 2006; Zhang 2010), social coherence (Ma and Wu 2005; Zhu et al. 2012), homeowners’ associations (Fu and Lin 2014), and everyday lives (Audin 2015; Tomba 2014; Wan 2016). To name a few, it indicates how proliferated the rapid urbanisation has inspired the academic scholars on the neighbourhood transformation. Focusing on the last 40 years of market reform, we will attempt to tell a story about Chinese neighbourhood in a multi-layered dimension.From the brief review, we can see that both danwei and shequ have played an essential role for the state building and social stability in the old and new sys-tems respectively. The question is then, how differ-ent is the practice of shequ building from the spatial regime of the danwei system? To answer this ques-tion, we need to understand the trajectory of China’s neighbourhood development as political and social 
constructs. The paper is divided into five sections. In 
the first section, we have discussed the terminology of neighbourhood in Chinese context and its research progress. In the second section, we describe the key 
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Fig.1 Structure of urban governance in Chinese Cities. Source: 
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features of the danwei and its spatial organisation. In the third section, we examine the dismantling of the 
danwei in the market economy, and its impact on the urban socio-spatial structure. In the fourth section, we present the ongoing practice of community build-ing and document a neighbourhood case with its spa-tial transformation and organisational structure. The paper concludes that the new practice of neighbour-hood management remains a sort of ‘old wine in new skins’ because of its top-down approach. Our focus throughout the paper is on the spatial gov-ernance at the neighbourhood level with regard of the social coherence in China. The paper is generally based on a literature review, longitudinal observation and documents from central and local authorities.
2. The spatial organisation of urban neighbour-
hoods in the planned economy – danwei At the beginning of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese leaders had little experi-ence in administering large cities (Friedmann 2005; 
Stapleton 2013). With strong support from the for-mer Soviet Union, China had adopted the ideology of Leninism with Chinese character. In the cities, danwei were the predominant organisers of neighbourhood life (Wu 2002; Bray 2005; Friedmann 2005; Li and Li 
2019). Meanwhile, the street offices ( jiedao) and resi-dents’ committees ( juweihui), as a kind of neighbour-hood agents, were established to facilitate industrial production, ideological inculcation, political and so-cial control for the minority of the population who did not belong to the danwei (Whyte and Parish 1984; 
Friedmann 2005; Bray 2006; Zhu et al. 2012). Under such a political arrangement, Chinese cities were built as producer centres rather than consumer ones, and the planning focus was on industry, instead of com-merce, services or even community (Miller 2012; Wu 2018). Physically, Chinese cities resembled those of other anti-consumerist socialist states in a shortage society. Constructed mostly of low-quality concrete, the cramped urban conditions compelled people to live in close contact with neighbours, sharing the open space as a private domain (Friedmann 2005; Ma and Wu 2005; Bray 2005; Hassenpflug 2009; Stapleton 2013; Wan 2016; Li and Li 2019). Aimed at catching up with Britain and overtaking the United States (gany-
ing chaomei), the emphasis of socialism was to de-velop and modernise heavy industry. To achieve this goal as quickly as possible, the Chinese government 
implemented the planned economy system, in which collective strength was orchestrated and mobilised for solving the big issues. It featured two characteris-tics: the improvement of productivity and the imple-mentation of egalitarian allocation. To ensure social stability, and to strengthen the social fabric and cohe-sion, the dual system of hukou registration between rural and city areas (a restrictive household registra-tion system) was written into law, institutionalising the divide between rural and urban people (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008; Zhang et al. 2014; Li and Li 2019). The hukou system was intended to prevent rural mi-gration into the cities, while the danwei system, a state run institution set up in closed compounds, was established, in which all the allocation of work, liv-ing, social welfare and security was strictly planned, controlled and managed at the expense of rural ar-eas. In other words, danwei assumed comprehensive functions, including economic production through planning and allocation, administrative management aimed at the state building, behavioural control and the surveillance of individual activities, and social welfare which covered the basic needs of the inhabit-ants (i.e. the so-called iron bowl from cradle to grave). For the city inhabitants, the danwei provided access to housing, medical care, and ration coupons (Bray 2005). As a matter of fact, there existed a micro-social world involving all aspects of livelihood and social production, through which national policy was articu-lated, and in which the nexus of government, society and individual was anchored (Lu 1989; Yang and Zhou 1999; Bray 2005; Li and Li 2019). In this context, every factory, school, hospital, store, government bureau etc. organised its personnel into a danwei compound, with an associated China Communist Party (CCP) branch to take leadership. The danwei compound was demarcated with a geo-graphical, administrative and social boundary, result-ing in a dual social structure between urban citizens and rural farmers. The whole city developed more as 
a collection of self-contained and spatially defined 
danwei compounds, invariably marked out by a high surrounding wall. The compound wall operates as a marker of social space, the wall marks the realm of the ‘production unit’ and the space within which the 
danwei reigns (Lu 1989; Yang and Zhou 1999; Bray 2005). On the walls, red political slogans were often posted to circulate the state policy and political ideol-ogy. Within the danwei compound, all the functional elements of production, living, service and recreation for the workers and their families were located and 
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spatially organised. The production area was com-posed of workshop, storage and logistics, whereas in the living area the housing buildings, kindergartens, dining halls, shops, schools, and clinics, boiler room and bathhouses were gathered. Besides there was a public square, meeting hall, leisure amenities and green parkland for all the workers and their fami-lies (Du et al. 2012; Xiao and Chai 2014; Luan 2014). In the planned economy, there were millions of such 
danwei compounds, which have ever shaped the Chi-nese urban structure. A prototypical example is Bai-
wanzhuang, the first residential community in China after 1949. Located in the second ring of western Beijing, Baiwanzhuang was a danwei neighbourhood for the staffs of four ministries in 1956. Designed by Zhang Kaiji, a famous Chinese architect, this danwei compound copied the idea of the Soviet Union’s neigh-bourhood for the spatial organisation of the residents’ daily lives. It covers an area of 24 ha, including private housing, middle school, public square, green land, cultural centre and commercial shops. Nevertheless, there often existed overlaps of interests or disputed issues between these functions, which demanded compromises and coordination through the danwei system (Wu 2015). Together with the hukou system, all personal activities were strictly disciplined, con-trolled and supervised. In the social narrative of the danwei system, the qual-ity of danwei was mainly judged by the social welfare and physical treatment it provided, including hous-ing allocation, medical facilities, education and even access to desired goods and scarce products (Bray 2005; Chan and Buckingham 2008; Zhang et al. 2014; 
Li and Li 2019). Within the danwei, dossiers were kept 
on work members that specified their class back-ground – whether they had come from a ‘good’ fam-ily of workers or a ‘bad’ family of capitalists, and class background and bad behaviour could stand in the way of a housing assignment or permission to marry. In particular, political performance and loyalty to the CCP played a critical role in treatment and career promotion. The relationship between workers’ treat-ment and dependent living was once generalised as an ‘organisational dependence’ mentality (Walder 1983; 
Read 2012; Li and Li 2019). As a result, a mind-set of identity and belonging was formed in the danwei, called compound culture (dayuan wenhua) (Yu 1991; 
Li et al. 2012). Once a member of the danwei, the in-dividual’s entire personal life, including occupation, daily behaviour and social interaction, was involved and determined. It symbolised immobility and per-
manence in a compulsory space which offered no al-ternatives. Public information was channeled exclu-sively through the state, and any individual initiative was seen as a form of rightist deviation and was disal-lowed. Once involved, it was impossible to escape. Despite the egalitarianism in the planned economy, there still existed the social-spatial differentiation be-tween the danwei compounds in terms of the location centrality, building quality, living environment, apart-ment size and access to public goods (Li and Li 2019). Based on the administrative hierarchy, the most priv-ileged danwei compound is the national institutions (like Baiwanzhuang mentioned above), followed by the provincial organs, then the military compounds, the public institutions at state and provincial level, and the municipal organs, while the non-danwei facto-ries and the traditional neighbourhoods were located at the lowest level. Within the danwei compound, the differential accesses to provisions corresponded to the rankings and status of its members and the per-sonal relationship with the relevant leaders. Such social-spatial differences also follow the principle of 
“differentiated pattern” (chaxu geju), termed by the social anthropologist Fei Xiaotong, who claimed the order of “the princes are above ministers, ministers 
(are) above the people” and the ethical relationship coincides with Chinese tradition (Fei 1998: 28), which further shaped the urban structure in the planned system. As a result, the danwei became the basic cell of the spatial regime and the articulation of the national, social and individual continuum, in which the nation-al integrity and social control was ensured, while the 
organisations like street offices and resident commit-tees played a marginalized role for the urban neigh-bourhood. 
3. The dissolution of the danwei system and the 
challenge of urban governance Since the reform and opening in the 1980s, the danwei system has begun to dissolve, and the once interde-pendent connection between government, society and 
danwei saw a new transition. Instead of total disap-pearance, danwei would then be free to pursue their core business while government took over responsi-bility for the provision of community services to the entire urban population (Wu 2002; Bray 2005; Heber-
er 2009). Nevertheless, it was supposed to be a tempo-rary approach, at most an effort for the navigation to a new type of neighbourhood governance. Therefore, 
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it is necessary to examine the paradigm transforma-tion in terms of employment, housing and spatial evo-lution.
3.1 Employment organisation and approachesAs mentioned above, in the danwei system, each urban citizen who is able to work should be entitled to a job created by the administration, coupled with the cor-responding social welfare and healthcare (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008; Zhang et al. 2014; Li and Li 2019). After the reform, China introduced a new employ-ment policy based on the job contract, and access to jobs shifted from administrative delivery to market orientation, driven by supply and demand (Unger and 
Chan 2004; Hebel 2009). During this transition, the 
market mechanism exercised a more significant role, and state owned companies lost their competitive edge and could not afford as many workers as before, leading to a great number of laid-off workers. In the same time, with increasing private enterprises, more employment opportunities were generated, which ab-sorbed most social labour forces, and this could have alleviated the social pressure. In the market economy, the new labour market func-tions as a platform through which job introductions, training programmes and unemployment insurance etc. are organised. Together with the companies, these employment organisations prepare various forums and meetings to communicate employment information and facilitate matching laid off workers, graduates, skilled professionals and migrants with jobs (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Hebel 2009). In ad-dition, there are also other employment and recruit-ing channels, including Internet websites, advertise-ments, or even informal dissemination on the streets. Once accepted by a company, the worker would sign a contract, which regulates the duration of the job, the working obligations and the relationship between employers and employees. 
3.2 The transformation of the housing marketHousing provision was one of the essential functions of the danwei system and symbolised the resource al-location of the planned economy. As long as a worker of danwei was listed in the urban citizen registry, he or she was entitled to enjoy housing allocation at low rent or for free (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Zhang 
et al. 2014). Given the supply shortages existing under the planned economy, housing space was often crowd-ed and limited (with 4 m² per person on average in China in 1978) (Hua 2006; Li and Li 2019). Up to 1978, nearly 95% of the urban workforce were still danwei employees, and most lived in compounds organising their daily life (Bray 2005).In 1998, the system of housing allocation was sup-planted by a monetary mechanism, which allowed the following options for housing: - Workers were encouraged to purchase their rented homes with a certain amount of subsidy from the company (Wu 2002; Hebel 2009). - Workers collaborated as a common owner to build 
new houses with self-financing under the patronage of their danweis (Unger and Chan 2004).- Workers in private companies, or entrepreneurs who were affected by demolition and redevelop-ment projects, could purchase social housing or re-location housing (Wu 2007).- White collar and middleclass workers who could af-ford to upgrade their residential homes moved into gated communities to enhance security and culti-vate a sense of belonging (Breitung 2012).- Migrant workers could either live in urban villages (which are located in outskirts or encircled by built environment) or in low rent houses provided by the 
firms recruiting them (Wu 2007).These different housing options have greatly allevi-ated pressure on urban housing, avoiding large-scale slums as in other developing countries, and improving the citizens’ living conditions. Such approach has also undoubtedly boosted China’s rapid urbanisation and contributed to the high growth rate of its economic performance, which further stimulates the expec-tation of the housing market (Wu 2015). Unlike the hard struggle to access an apartment in danwei, it is now about the location, size of the apartment, build-ing quality, neighbourhood relationship and the sur-rounding environment (Friedmann 2005; Miller 2012; 
Waley 2016). In other words, housing began to define the individual’s daily life or even their life destiny (e.g. access to public facility; or as a precondition for the school enrolment, marriage of young couples, raising children, or taking care of elders). Increasingly, the in-
dividual customised housing style is flourishing with the new social diversity in terms of spatial arrange-
ment and organisation (e.g. with a fitness room, study room, sleeping room, guest room, kitchen and WC). As 
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a result, housing has become a symbol of self-realisa-tion and social status for citizens.With the increasing income generated by econom-ic development, housing has become an ambition, which, conversely, fuels the reals estate growth over the past years. Nevertheless, with the slowing down of economic increment and the market saturation, the inventory assets are emphasized and the concerns of the neighbourhood are upgraded. The citizens begin to care more about their life quality, personal aspira-tion and the sense of community. On the one hand, the environmental awareness like Nimbyism, travel 
and tourism, shopping, fitness, and cultural activities, which are all generated and encouraged (for the con-sumption driven economic development) (Friedmann 2005; Miller 2012; Waley 2016); on the other hand, voluntary groups and social activities aimed at im-
proving the quality of the community are flourishing, which are motivated by citizens and tolerated by the local government. As a result, different programmes aimed at improving the community structure are practised and promoted (Tomba 2005; Wu 2018).
3.3 The urban socio-spatial restructuring With the market-oriented economy and housing re-form in 1998, the whole urban space is being restruc-tured in forms of Fordism, Modernism and Post-mod-ernism (Wu 2015). Driven by the boom of the private companies, a bulging middle class of entrepreneurs 
has emerged, who became the first group to purchase the luxurious apartments and villas in the favourable locations. Increasingly, the introduction of housing 
transaction system has prompted the reshuffle of the housing distribution structure. Such monetisation and deregulation of the housing market has enhanced socio-spatial transformation, causing mosaic land-scapes to arise within a city, which resulted at least in three types of housing and neighbourhood:- Old tenements and lane- or courtyard-housing in the inner-city, in which jiedao and juweihui have 
played a significant role in organising local collec-tive industries as well as political and social life, and where most housing was put under the control of the municipal housing bureau during the social-ist transformation (Hua 2006; Li and Li 2019). At the same time, major swaths of the old cities have been cleared for redevelopment into high-rise apartment compounds and commercial complexes, as well as 
expansive public squares, landscaped boulevards, and other urban amenities as part of municipal governments’ place-making endeavours (Wu 2015; 
Friedmann and Chen 2011). In the most favourable location, there is the western style of central busi-
ness district (CBD) and the complex of hotel, office, park, shopping mall, convention and apartment (HOPSCA), where the high-end productive services and headquarters are concentrated.- Commodity-housing estates in redeveloped inner-city neighbourhoods and newly developed subur-ban districts, such as the large housing estates or neighbourhoods catering primarily to the nouveau 
riche and new middle class of professional and man-agerial workers. The great majority of these housing estates are gated and heavily guarded, and provid-ed with such amenities as landscape gardens, tennis courts, and swimming pools (Li et al.2012). In addi-tion, there are exclusive designated areas like the industrial parks, technological development zones and wholesale centres aimed at bolstering urban development.- Urban villages and resettlement neighbourhoods on the former urban-rural fringe. In theory, the land in such villages is owned by rural collectives, or collec-tively by the villagers. Yet these villages today are completely encircled by urban expansion (Wu 2007; 
Li et al.2012). In fact, much of the land within each village has been requisitioned for development pur-poses. Deprived of the single most important means of production – the land they formerly farmed – indi-vidual peasant households built multi-story housing on the land reserved for their own consumption and rented out the unneeded space mainly to inbound migrants from the vast rural hinterlands. Among the three housing types, the commercial apartment buildings, which correspond the former privileged danwei compound, dominate the highest quality of the neighbourhood, followed by the newly established resettlement, then the old danwei com-pound, while the old neighbourhood located at the lowest level of the quality ranking. Within each type, there are detailed categories, e.g. the commercial es-tates have high, middle class and affordable housing, while the resettlement housings are divided into an old demolishment area and the suburban village area. Simultaneously, these housing types have demon-strated distinctive sets of residential experiences and neighborhood relations. As such, these spatial entities 
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exhibit an array of behavioral and social markers (Wu 2002; Li et al.2012). In general, the urban transfor-mation is featuring material fetishism, consumption 
and philistinism reflected in service and entertain-ment streetscapes, such as trendy restaurants, beau-ty shops, KTV (karaoke clubs) and shopping centres. Within the inner city, local residents are crowded out because of skyrocketing housing prices arising from luxury housing development and upgrading in-
frastructure, generating a process of gentrification. In suburban areas, new housing buildings are boom-ing, driven by strong demand (Waley 2016). With en-croachment and the relocation programme, these ar-eas have been converted into the built environment and institutionalised in the urban administrative dis-tricts (Wu 2015). Although the former villagers’ sta-tus is incorporated into citizenship hukou, most have kept their entrenched behaviours and habits as if they were still living in their traditional rural community with its informal buildings (Roy 2005; Saunders 2012). Urban gardening activities, like planting vegetables or even raising chickens in the neighbourhood, are still prevalent. In the urban villages, there is the wide-spread thriving of the informal sectors which are so 
typical of developing countries, such as floating ven-dors, street hawkers and migrant workers with their families, eking out their livings (Kochan 2015). Mean-while, most young university graduates who cannot afford decent apartments are living in mortgage hous-es (Caijing 2013; Huang 2010), or informal places like underground rooms (nicknamed yi zu or ant tribe), tiny apartments (nicknamed wo ju zu or snail-house tribe) or as nomads (Gu et al. 2015).
3.4 Spatial transformation of the danwei compound In the danwei system, the worker’s house was often lo-cated near the factory or within the compound, form-ing an independent society separated from outside. There are some scholars who view such spatial prox-imity as certain advantages, including saving time 
and avoiding traffic jams when travelling to and from work (Chai 2014). With the socioeconomic and insti-tutional transformation, the urban spatial change is also mirrored in the danwei compound. First, the in-ner land use of the danwei is being intensified via the urban land reform; second, driven by skyrocketing demand, more buildings make the spatial arrange-ment much more crowded and chaotic. Particularly after the 1990s, the residential land use in danwei saw a dramatic increase after most non-productive facili-
ties, like the auditorium, canteen, workers’ centre and bathrooms, were demolished (Luan 2014).The freedom of personal mobility between danwei and the outside also contributes to a heterogeneous space. As a result, the danwei that bounded the former workers together has lost its meaning, and the prox-imity model of working and living has collapsed (Chai 2014). With the increasing density of the built envi-ronment, public space, squares and green land are be-ing encroached and squeezed. For those danwei com-pounds with an industrial function, the production function is relocated to suburban industrial parks, while the old production area within the inner city has been converted to commercial, service and hous-ing use (Du et al. 2012). The dissolution of the danwei system prompted more labour mobility throughout the whole country and neighbourhood heterogene-ity was increased. Decentralised economic decision-making legalised previously banned forms of private and semi-private enterprise, opening China to foreign investment and trade, and encouraging workers to move freely at their will (Friedmann 2005; Wu 2015). Consequently, the model of home-work proximity has collapsed and the danwei compound is now integrated into the urban community district.After the reform, four decades of rapid economic growth have completely transformed China’s urban landscape, and its urbanisation has supplanted in-dustrialisation as the main pillar of regional develop-ment (Wu 2015). During this period, the overall rate of urbanisation has increased from 18 per cent in 
1978 to 43 per cent in 2005; in 2017 the figure was over 60% (China’s National Bureau of Statistics 2018). In the meantime, more Chinese have enjoyed unprec-
edented levels of affluence and a surprising degree of personal autonomy and freedom of movement, to accommodate the overwhelming number of new citizens prompts more buildings, facilities and in-frastructures. This rapid pace of urban development has resulted in a range of economic decentralization, social mobility and spatial heterogeneity. The cities 
have seen the influx of rural migrants, laid-off work-ers and private company workers who are no longer attached to the danwei (Chai 2014). At the same time, the former organisations like jiedao and juweihui were challenged by the formidable social service for differ-ent groups (Bray 2006). Given this transitional situa-tion and coupled with the urban individualism, social centrifugal forces began to form, leaving a vacuum of urban governance and social bonding (Friedmann 
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2005; Heberer and Goebel 2013; Shieh and Friedmann 2008; Wu 2018). Accordingly, a new form of the neigh-bourhood governance is urgently needed.
4. The new practice of neighbourhood gover-
nance: community building (shequ jianshe) With the demise of the danwei and the increase of socio-spatial mobility, the public service and welfare delivery for the neighbourhood was withdrawn, and the central government faced the risk of social prob-lems due to the demise of the old governance model (Bray 2006; Heberer 2009; Wu 2018). One of the main challenges was the disappearance of the organisa-tional base for providing social services (Heberer and 
Goebel 2013; Audin 2015). To cope with this problem and to ensure social stability at the local level, the cen-tral government initiated the concept of ‘community building’ (shequ jianshe) in 2000. Defined by hous-ing units, shequ is regarded as an interface between the administration and the population that enables residents to participate in public affairs and decision-making on local issues, which could further increase social connectedness (Friedmann 2005; Tomba 2014). Together with the local government, the shequ forms a kind of grassroots organisation aimed at self-man-
agement, education and service to maintain urban stability. All the concerns and complaints of residents, including public policy, social services and organi-sational activities, should be collected by the shequ, which transfers them on to the local government (Fig. 2). Initially, the shequ management model implies the beginning of a bottom-up civil society under top-down guidance at the local government level (Solinger 1999; Bray 2006; Friedmann and Chen 2011; Heberer and Goebel 2013; Audin 2015). Since its release, major efforts have been undertaken by authorities in most cities to implement and popularize the program of 
shequ jianshe. The objective is to carry out a major re-organisation and re-ordering of urban society (Bray 2006; Heberer and Goebel 2013). In this respect, the 
potential implications are significant.To further strengthen the shequ organisation, the central government issued the document “Views on Strengthening and Improving shequ jianshe” in 2010 (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2010), which identified three main goals of the residential committee, i.e. to en-hance the residents’ ability to govern by themselves; to cooperate with the local authority for the public issues; and to supervise community activities. As a management unit, the shequ has a defined territory and population, it is staffed by a corps of professional 
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officials trained in the methods of shequ jianshe, and it has a budget (ibid). According to its organisation, the director of the shequ is in charge of overall coordina-tion with support by an assistant director. Each staff 
member is responsible for a specific area related to the overall goals. Initially, the shequs are supposed to be self-administered entities. In reality, the shequs are less concerned with self-administration but rather with activities which used to be the tasks of the state, like birth control, paying out pensions, examining preconditions for income support to families with no 
or low income, mediating conflicts among residents, handling divorce applications, care of sick persons, of handicapped people, drug addicts and persons with a previous conviction, and psychological advice (e.g. domestic violence or attempted suicide) (ibid). In concrete terms, these areas overlap. More impor-tant, one of their crucial tasks is to mobilize residents to become involved in social community affairs like taking care of the socially weak (elderly, disabled or sick persons, etc.) (Heberer and Goebel 2013). If the 
shequ jianshe is even partly successful, then, it will reduce the future costs of government considerably. Moreover, it may partially alleviate the dangerous dislocations, ruptures and disparities that currently threaten to undermine the remaining vestiges of state legitimacy in present-day China (Heberer 2009). Nev-ertheless, the operation of shequ is largely affected by 
the street office, especially its personal influence on the designation of shequ committee. Such institutional arrangement is often criticised as a kind of participa-tory bureaucratisation (Audin 2015; Wu 2018).In 2017, to improve the management and the organi-sational capability of the shequ under the CCP leader-ship, the central government issued the ‘Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Strengthening and Improving Urban and Rural Com-munity Governance’ (CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council 2017). Consequently, the shequs contain within them cells of the CCP, and the relationship be-tween the shequ and the CCP is becoming ambiguous. More often, their directors double as party secretar-ies, which can strengthen party control and political surveillance. At the national level, although the effort to promote the shequ is enthusiastically extolled at by the CCP and coordinated by the national MCA, the animating force behind the shequ jianshe has been a highly statist conception of this malleable term. Rhetoric to the con-trary, what the MCA has in mind is not the fostering 
of self-organising communities as collectives empow-ered to act as a group toward independently deter-mined goals (Read 2012; Wu 2018). On the surface, the project has an ambiguous relationship to the building of the kind of interpersonal networks and solidarity among citizens that might normally be termed ur-ban community (Heberer 2009; Audin 2015). In fact, its primary aim is to bolster and reequip the state’s organisational mechanisms within residential neigh-bourhoods while devising new ways to make this organisation useful to residents so that it is viewed favourably by them. As Heberer and Göbel (2013) ar-gue in their study of communities in Shenyang, Chong-qing, and Shenzhen: the reorganisation of China’s 
shequ has greatly increased the infrastructural power of the party state, as it has deepened the CCP’s pen-etration of the urban grassroots (Heberer and Göbel 2013; Kostka 2019). Normally, the national level for-mulates a broad policy and its goals. Provincial and local governments then translate them into concrete guidelines and measures, with the aim to standard-ise the practices. Nevertheless, the policies of shequ 
jianshe are mostly concerned with physical planning and sophisticated technology. This is typically re-
flected by the latest “Document on the Pilot-Project of shequ jianshe in the Future in Zhejiang Province”, published in March 2019 (Commission of Development 
and Reform of Zhejiang Province 2019). The document includes nine scenarios of shequ jianshe including health, enterprise, architecture, transport, environ-ment and service to management. In the project, the concepts of digital technology, smart city and social credit system are highlighted, and the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of the government re-garding neighbourhood management are repeatedly stressed (ibid). In the long term, the CCP and the MCA expect to implement and popularise the best practice of shequ experiment, and possibly, to promote it in all neighbourhoods in China.With the improvement of living standards and the rise of consumerism in China, the ownership awareness of the residents is enhanced (Friedmann 2005). Early in 
1991, the first ‘Home-Owners Self-Organization Com-mittee’ (HOSOC) was established in Shenzhen, their boards were supposed to be elected by all house own-ers and are accountable to them. Such organisations differ from the shequ committee by being bottom-up organisations and by representing the interests of their constituents (Heberer 2009). However, the po-litical discussion are off-limit. In 2007, it was institu-tionalised and renamed as ‘Home Owner Association’ 
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(HOA) based on the ‘Regulation of Property Right’5. Following the regulation, the HOAs are entitled to hire property management companies (PMC) which are responsible for the maintenance of apartments and cleanliness, public security of their neighbour-hood (Fig. 3). When problems in the neighbourhoods occur, the HOAs try to sort them out in negotiations with the PMC. In contrast to the shequ elections, most home owners are well informed about the elections of their HOA and regard it as an autonomous organ (Heberer 2009). Albeit, the local authorities now and then intervene their daily activities.
5. ConclusionAll political is areal, and the local scale is an effective tool to implement state policy. In the liberal democ-racy, neighbourhoods are regarded as area-based lev-erage, where the bottom-up civil society is anchored and empowered (Drilling and Schnur 2012; Friedmann and Chen 2011; Wan 2016). In China, however, the government-orchestrated neighbourhoods are uti-lised as a spatial regime for social engineering. In the planned economy, the danwei was a sort of organisa-tional and productive platform for state building and for securing social stability. With the political, eco-nomic and social transformation following the reform and opening policy, the spatial structure of the dan-
wei has been deconstructed and social heterogeneity has emerged in Chinese cities. The socialisation and externalisation of non-productive danwei functions 
have prompted the spatial shift from danwei to shequ. The micro-scale transformation of the neighbourhood epitomises the broader urban restructuring in China, 
thus it is of huge significance for the understanding of China’s urban transition and urban challenges from a continuum perspective.After four decades of sustained economic growth, China’s spatial management is facing new challenges for the social cohesion involving the various expecta-tions of different interest groups. The government has made social stability its top priority because of rapid 
urbanisation, large social discrepancies, spatial mo-
bility, individualism and conflict interest, which could spawn social crises or even political unrest. There-fore, both the central and local authorities have been enthusiastically promoting a harmonious society and peaceful community as a rhetoric for community building to counter centrifugal trends in the social sphere. The practice of shequ jianshe, initiated by the central government, aims at maintaining social sta-bility at the local level and at alleviating the frictions triggered by institutional reforms. Initially, the shequ model was supposed to replace danwei, which not only addresses the various needs and requests of resi-dents, but also controls and supervises all channels of social reproductions in a new institutional paradigm. The practice of shequ jianshe, however, remains still tentative development based on the pilot project. 
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Unlike in the danwei, work and residence in shequs are no longer spatially integrated. People have be-come much more mobile, both vertically (social class) and horizontally (space), and this transformation has been mapped onto urban space as patterns of exclu-sive gated communities and dilapidated neighbour-hoods. The city continues to expand outward and un-dergoes spatial restructuring. But from the operation of the power, the shequ still bears some resemblance 
to the danwei system, like ‘old wine in new skins’, espe-
cially with regard to its top-down governance. Even with-
out the danwei system, the CCP and the state continue 
to dominate all aspects of personal and neighbourhood 
life, irrespective of rapidly rising incomes and the neolib-
eral rhetoric of privatisation and commodification (Wan 
2016; Wu 2018). All this has demonstrated that the shequ 
management fails to stimulate bottom-up initiatives and 
empower residents to unfold human flourishment and re-
vitalise social interaction. With its physical deterioration, 
the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood, the sense of 
place identity, and the sense of community are seriously 
disturbed despite of the awareness of housing property. 
Given the current authoritarian political framework, this 
would hardly be improved in the near future. Ultimately, 
to achieve the goal of shequ jianshe, it is necessary to 
boost the citizen’s involvement and foster the civil society 
(Friedmann and Chen 2011). In sum, the material lives 
of the citizens are generally better off, but the bottom-up 
initiatives like social engagement and public participa-
tion, which correspond the spirit of community building, 
are unable to keep pace with the rapid transformation of 
urban society.
Notes
1 While the district governments (quzhengfu) focus on eco-
nomic development issues, the street office ( jiedao ban-
shichu), an outpost agency of a district, directly organises and manages the residential community.2 According to Urban Residential Planning and Design Standard GB 50180-2018, xiaoqu, also called neighbour-hood block, refers to the residential area surrounded by urban roads or natural boundaries, and corresponding to 1,000-3,000 residents, about 300-1,000 sets of housing, land area of 2 ha to 4 ha, equipped with a set of public ser-vice facilities that can meet the basic material and cultur-al life needs of the residents. It is designed after Clarence 
Perry’s ‘Neighbourhood Unit’ in 1929 (Perry et al. 1929). 3 More details see part 4, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.4 Urban Residential Planning and Design Standard GB 50180-2018.
5 The PRC Property Law was published in March 2007.
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